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ABSTRACT
A major topic in software engineering is how to reuse or recycle product
components across more than one system or project, making it
unnecessary to keep specifying, building, and testing new products
completely from scratch. While reuse may seem to be primarily a
technological problem, this article illustrates how reusability also needs
to be seen as a managerial and organizational problem. This is because
the recycling of specifications, detailed designs, and actual code, as well
as development tools, engineering methods, and test cases, can either
be systematic -- occurring as frequently as possible due to management
planning as well as provision of s pport technologies and incentives --
or accidental -- occurring infrequently and in an ad hoc manner due to
the lack of formal planning, support, or personnel incentives. The focus
of the discussion is on techniques and tools used in Japanese software
factories, especially Toshiba, which in the mid-1980s was routinely
delivering software systems with nearly 50% reused code.
INTRODUCTION
A topic in software engineering as well as in product development management
in general has continued to arouse interest among academics and practitioners: how
to reuse or recycle product components across more than one system or project,
making it unnecessary to keep specifying, building, and testing new products
completely from scratch.' The real problem is how build, deposit, and then find
existing components so that reuse does not cost more than making new components,
and final products with a lot of reused designs or code do not contain too many
compromises in performance. Reuse may thus seem to be primarily a technological
problem, depending, for example, on the structure of specific software components
and their suitability for different application contexts, user requirements, or
hardware platforms. This article, however, draws on examples from Japan to
demonstrate that, in software as in other engineering domains, reusability also needs
to be seen as a managerial and organizational problem. This is because the recycling
of specifications, detailed designs, and actual code, as well as development tools,
engineering methods, and test cases, can either be systematic -- occurring as
frequently as possible due to management planning as well as provision of support
technologies and incentives -- or accidental -- occurring infrequently and in an ad
hoc manner due to the lack of formal planning, support, or personnel incentives.
Of course, if every product that a development group tries to build is totally
different, then reuse is either impossible or limited to elementary process knowledge,
such as general project-management expertise, or very common subroutines, such as
screen handlers or date-conversion modules. For a series of projects where reuse is
possible, however, many firms still find that reuse does not occur to the same extent
as there exist opportunities based on redundancies in customer requirements and
program functions. Because of the potential benefits to productivity and quality from
reusing proven components, how to raise reusability to both technological and
managerial or organizational limits has become a major strategic concern for software
producers. This is especially true in Japan, where there persists a small number of
available software packages, severe shortages of skilled programmers, and large
demand for labor-intensive custom software (including programs embedded in
hardware) where many of the required functions are not unique to each project.
REUSE CONCEPTS AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT
Reusable Components: Just as reuse of experience embodied in methods and tools is
a common engineering and manufacturing practice, reuse of software components has
its analog in any conventional industry where engineers design standardized,
interchangeable parts that factories mass produce and then use in identical or even
somewhat different end products. The notion of recycling pieces of software first
occurred to programmers in the 1950s who found they did not have to keep rewriting
common subroutines, such as for converting temperatures or sorting different types
of data. By the mid-1960s, packages of reusable Fortran routines were commercially
available from IBM. The idea of making and using reusable components gained further
popularity during the 1968 NATO conference on software engineering when M.D.
Mcllroy of AT&T suggested that governments and companies establish "components
factories" to create mass-producible modules to serve as "black boxes" for new
programs. Producers would benefit by building new programs from existing
components that represented efficient designs, while users would have products that,
even though containing some standardized parts, were tailored to their needs.2
Although Mcllroy referred primarily to reusable subroutines at the code level, reuse
has gradually come to include data types, architectures, designs, whole programs,
modules, and other elements (such as tools, methods, and experience), in addition to
executable code, which often proved most difficult to reuse across different
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applications or computer systems.3
Benefits and Costs: While only a few empirical studies of reuse exist because of the
difficulty of compiling, analyzing, and revealing company data, available research
indicates that reuse has a positive impact on productivity, at least when designs and
code are not changed much before they are redeployed . 4 Reuse prior to coding seems
particularly valuable because writing requirements and detailed designs often
accounts for a much larger portion of development costs than coding. Developers can
achieve large savings in testing as well if they build reusable modules as independent
subsystems and then thoroughly test these before recycling. Reusing debugged
designs and coded modules can also reduce long-term maintenance costs, often the
most expensive part of software development. In addition, reuse has the potential of
leveraging good design across more than one project.- Most reuse proponents cited
in the literature have even argued that, since research on software tools and
methodologies has brought only limited gains, reusability, including design reuse and
automatic program generation, remained the only way to achieve large advances in
productivity.5
On a small scale, prior tothe 1980s, firms met Mcl Iroy's goal with the increasing
use of packaged subroutines and modifiable packaged software, as well as with the
gradual introduction of operating systems such as UNIX and programming languages
that supported subroutine reuse and portability of code and tools across different
hardware architectures. But, despite some progress, such as at Raytheon in the late
1970s, extensive reuse appeared not to become a major objective of software-
engineering practice in the United States until a revival in the early 1980s in academic
circles and at firms such as the ITT Corporation. In the meantime, Japanese
applications-software producers, led by Toshiba, began pursuing reusability as a
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primary emphasis in the mid-1970s. A study of 40 Japanese and U.S. software
systems published in 1990 found that Japanese reuse levels were at least twice those
in the U.S. sample (averaging 18% compared to under 10% of delivered lines of code),
although the averages were not as large as sometimes claimed.6 Nor did the Japanese
achieve high levels of reuse until after they accumulated better component libraries
and support tools, and introduced systematic management practices and incentives.
Reuse in Japan and elsewhere has made slow progress because of various costs
and constraints. On the technical side, many factors influenced whether a particular
project can recycle existing components, such as the match in application or function
of the existing software compared to the new design requirements; the particular
language and the characteristics of the target computers; and the program structure
and degree of modularity, or how independent modules are of other modules or
subsystems in the original program based on the construction of the interfaces
between various layers in a complete system (the new application software, subsidiary
applications packages, utilities, the operating system, and the hardware).
Structured techniques also teach developers to conceptualize software systems anew
in a top-down manner, from large functions to smaller tasks, and to write programs
for specific applications. Reusing designs, code, or architectures, on the other
hand, requi res conceptualization and construction around pieces of existing software,
and thus acceptance of possible compromises in system features or performance.
On the organizational side, writing and documenting components for reuse
generally requires extra time that individual customers might not want or should not
want to pay for. Project managers, and project members, have good reason to resent
this extra time, unless they see opportunities to save time and money in the future.
For example, systematic recycling of designs or code required standardization of
module interfaces to fit components together, whether or not these standards prove
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useful or necessary for a given product. Developers need common tools, such as
libraries to store programs and documents, and reusable-parts retrieval systems, to
make it easier to find and understand pieces of software someone else had written. In
designing software for potential reuse, designers have to think of more possible
applications and more carefully document their work.
Reuse thus involves potential tradeoffs in product uniqueness and costs in the
short term on any individual project, even though recycling promises higher
productivity and even quality over a series of projects by eliminating the need to
reinvent designs or continue to do coding, documenting, and testing for similar
applications. In fact, while many software developers and customers might prefer
uniquely designed programs, the widespread use of software packages, as well as
several studies indicating that somewhere between 40% and 90% of the code applications
producers delivered in a given year consisted of similar functions, indicated therewas
vast potential for more reuse. 
Reuse Support: In addition to emphasizing and teaching abstraction techniques,
Japanese firms introduced several tools during the 1980s to support abstraction in
general as well as the specific reuse of system architectures, data types, designs, and
coded modules or whole programs. Hitachi, for example, began using in the early
1980s a tool called EAGLE (Effective Approach to Achieving High Level Software
Productivity), which helped applications programmers build software from reusable
modules as well as structure new designs and code for reuse. Company engineers
claimed that users could develop 60% of the application programs customers demanded
from 22 patterns, all accessible in the EAGLE database and modified only slightly for
individual applications.8
EAGLE users first analyze data items and interrelationships and catalog these
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in a data-dictionary database. Next they register the system-design and program
specifications in another database. At this point, EAGLE searches a pattern and parts
library for existing components the system might reuse. This makes it possible to
assemble some programs almost entirely from the library, although most programs
written with the tool contain reused patterns and parts as well as new designs and
routines. EAGLE next generates an outline of the program from the detailed (module-
level) specifications and then produces a source program. Programmers can edit the
source program to add particular functions wanted by individual users. Finally,
EAGLE automatically generates test commands and carries them out in conversational
Japanese. During 1984-1986, Hitachi refined EAGLE to allow it to handle PL/1 and a
Japanese specifications language, in addition to COBOL. The new version of the tool
also lets customers design their own menus (within certain limits). With these
improvements, Hitachi began using EAGLE to construct database and data-
communications programs, along with common business programs. In terms of
performance, according to Hitachi's internal audits, programs designed with EAGLE
generally showed a 2.2-fold improvement in productivity (measured by lines of code
per programmer and manpower costs in a given time period). EAGLE also shifted more
effort into system design and substantially reduced time necessary for testing.
NEC in 1984 began using a similar tool set called SEA/I (System Engineering
Architecture/I). Its three subsystems consist of an Empirical Information Base
(El B), a collection of support tools, and a standardized methodology covering system
proposals, design, implementation, testing, and installation. The EIB provides set
formats and ready access to previously written system definitions, layout designs,
systemand program structures, programmodules ("sou rce parts"), tested programs,
and test data. Rather than requiring one development methodology for all customers,
SEA/I also specifies five approaches.
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First, the tool users can adopt a conventional life-cycle model and move,
sequentially with the usual iterations, from requirements definition through
implementation and testing. A second approach relies on SEA/I's software CAD
capabilities for prototyping, design, and then semi-automated generation of program
components (automation except for some special coding). A third calls for building
new software from reusable design specifications and coded modules, with minimal
modifications but customization in the sense that SEA/I users can offer different
configurations of the components for different customers; this approach minimizes
testing, since the program components come from a library of fully tested items. A
fourth model addresses the development of customized systems where SEA/I helps
users build a prototype and finished program without changing individual modules but
by offering the customer a combination o; existing applications packages; in this case,
the new program needs little if any coding or testing., The fifth calls for the use of
SEA/I tools to analyze, restructure, and re-document existing programs built before
the introduction of SEA/I, to facilitate enhancements, reuse, or maintenance of these
older software systems.
Fujitsu has a comparable but larger set of reuse-support tools, including
several dedicated to particular applications. These include PARADIGM (for general
business applications primarily in COBOL), ACS-APG (a specialized version of
PARADIGM that supports applications control structure and program generation for
more complex on-line transactions processing systems), and BAGLES as well as
BAG LES/CAD (specialized versions of PARADIGM forgenerating ban king applications
software). BAGLES/CAD is particularly significant as a simplified, menu-based tool
that allows users with little or no knowledge of software programming to produce
executable banking programs of considerable size and complexity.
A sample of Japanese R&D for reuse support comes from work originating with
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Japan's Fifth-Generation Computer Project. A group within Fujitsu's central research
laboratories has developed an experimental programming-support system that
includes an English-like specification language mechanically translated into predicate
logic formulas, and a logic-based system to retrieve reusable softwaremodules, stored
by function, from a modules library. The library stores specifications for each
module, coded in PROLOG, which the tool compares with requirements to identify
functionally equivalent modules reusable for particular parts of a new program. The
tool goes beyond conventional reuse-support systems by adding superior retrieval
and verification capabilities. Earlier reuse-support methods located modules by
matching specifications or code, whereas the PROLOG system makes it possible to
identify modules with similar functions even if the specifications do not match in a
conventional search process. Another feature of the tool, which supports reuse as
well as maintenance, is an "explanation generator" that analyzes code and produces
English-like explanations of the program logic by comparing the code with preexisting
templates (skeletons) of explanations stored in a separate database.
CASE STUDY: THE TOSHIBA SOFTWARE FACTORY 9
Factory Structure and Process: Toshiba established a software factory in 1977 to
develop real-time process-control software embedded in hardware systems made at the
company's Fuchu Works, located in the western outskirts of Tokyo. In the late 1980s,
the Works had approximately 7,500 employees primarily in four areas: Information
Processing and Control Systems, Energy Systems, Industrial Equipment, and
Semiconductors (Printed Circuit Boards). Product departments within the divisions
corresponded roughly to 19 product lines; each department contained sections for
hardware and software design as well as for manufacturing, testing, quality
assurance, and product control. Approximately half the Fuchu Works' employees were
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software developers, with about 2,300working in the Software Factory, assigned from
the product departments for particular projects.
Following this matrix structure, Toshiba had no single manager of its Software
Factory, although the factory contained a permanent staff spread over five sections.
Four provided administrative support for software production, relying on systems
analysts as well as programming and testing personnel f rom product departments. The
fifth maintained the tool set, called the SoftwareWorkbench (SWB), helped R&D teams
develop new tools, and operated the SWB Service Center, the file-storage room, and
other related SWB facilities. It also coordinated software quality-assurance plans for
the entire factory and provided assistance to keep these plans on track, in addition
to collecting data to evaluate productivity, reuse, and software reliability.
Individual software systems were huge. The average applications program
consisted of about 4 million equivalent-assembler source lines (EASL) of code; the
range was 1 to 21 million EASL. Projects (including hardware and software
components) generally took three years to complete. Four or five systems analysts
normally did high-level design and worked full-time on one project until completion.
Another 10 to 15 engineers did detailed design, while 70 to 80 programmers completed
the coding and debugging. To divide and then coordinate their activities, Toshiba
broke down the software production process into distinct phases, following a life-
cycle model common to both hardware and software products: requirements
specification and design, manufacturing, testing, installation and alignment, and
maintenance. Prescribed procedures and specific tools from the SWB system provided
support for each phase.
While having analysts, designers, and programmers in the same departments
encouraged communication between the different groups, Toshiba also relied on a
formalized process for requirements specification and design, which it broke down
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into two parts. Part I included the customer's specific objectives as well as constraints
such as cost and time, and particular methodologies the customer wanted Toshiba to
follow. Systems analysts outside the factory drew up these system designs. Part II,
a more precisely structured document done after analysis of the Part I requirements,
outlined the overall functions of the program and simulated its operation to generate
performance parameters that Toshiba used to negotiate prices and other contract
elements with the customer. Designers already assigned to the project and physically
located in the Software Factory drew up these Part II specifications. On some
occasions, such as when they did not want to share too much proprietary knowledge
with Toshiba, customers wrote their own Part I specifications and then the Software
Factory turned these into code.
Reuse Promotion: Toshiba's strategy for accommodating rising demand for software
and ensuring a high level of productivity and quality, despite variations in individual
skills, was to build products from standardized components reassembled or combined
with new components. This approach - - the systematic creation and reuse of reusable
software parts -- lay at the heart of Toshiba's concept of factory production for
software. Toshiba did not solve all problems related to reusability; it did not, for
example, utilize very formalized or sophisticated methods for classifying reusable
software components and recycling them across different product families.
Nonetheless, the factory simplified or restricted problems to manageable areas, and
provided incentives both for project managers and personnel to write reusable
software and reuse it frequently, at least within similar application domains. How the
factory promoted reuse in the face of organizational as well as technological
constraints illustrates the strategic management of technology, integrating product
planning, engineering tools and techniques, personnel training and incentives, as
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well as management control systems.
Approximately half the software Toshiba's factory delivered in 1985 (the last
year for which Toshiba has made data public) consisted of reused code and designs,
including some applications packages developed in product departments to serve as
major components of customized systems and designs or code with minor modifications
(usually no more than 20% of the contents of an individual module). The other half of
delivered software was new, mainly written for an individual customer or application,
again including some tailored packages. The SWB system collected data on all reused
elements, converted designs to equivalents in generated code, and paid particular
attention to a simple output measure: the number of reused lines converted to EASL
code in a delivered system.
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the three categories into which the
approximately 50% reused software fell. One category consisted of packages of design
skeletons, called "white-box" parts, kept in department program libraries. These
described functions common to applications within a particular domain, such as
nuclear-power plant control systems, or steel-mill process control systems, and
ranged in size from 1,000 to 10,000 EASL. Software developers in the factory often
merely chose the right package and filled in blank slots for different customers; code
generators produced much of the actual code. Developers could also modify the
designs. Another portion consisted of relatively large utility programs that worked
in between operating systems and industry-specific applications packages to control
communications, database management, and other basic functions; or tools and other
embedded sub-programs generally usable in a variety of systems. Toshiba deposited
these components, which ranged in size from 10,000 to 100,000 EASL, mainly in
department libraries but sometimes in the factory library system. The final category
(about 10% of delivered code) consisted of black-box modules, usually no more than
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3,000 EASL in size. These common subroutines, also accessible from across product
departments through a central factory library, covered functions demanded in most
systems the factory built, such as for managing general-purpose displays or
converting temperature data.
For the other 50% of delivered software that Toshiba wrote from scratch for
individual customers, in addition to SWB tools and conventional languages such as
Fortran, factory departments were beginning to deploy very-high level (4th-
generation) application-specific languages for systems design that eliminated coding
as a separate task. An example is POL (Problem-Oriented Language), which the
nuclear power-plant department relied on extensively to design components specific
to individual customers. Unlike conventional computer languages, POL relied on
menus and tables with blank spaces representing control logic for various functions
(found primarily in nuclear power plants, however, limiting the use of this language
to one application domain). Engineers filled in the blanks and a compiler produced
executable code. Another tool that worked with POL, RRDD (Reverse Requirements
Definition and Documentation System), generated updated documentation
automatically, in the event personnel changed parts of an existing program.
In order to build programs around existing components as much as possible,
Toshiba required projects to draw up plans, called "repeat maps," at the
requirements-analysis and module-design phases. Systems analysts produced the
first map by comparing the main subsystems they wanted to build with existing
packages in the department and factory libraries. After inserting the appropriate
packages into the system under construction, designers in the factory drew up
another set of repeat maps, identifying specific modules to reuse or modify and new
components needed to implement requirements.
The organization Toshiba created to promote reuse and overcome short-term
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concerns of project managers and development personnel relied on software reusing
parts steering committees along with software reusing parts manufacturing
departments and software reusing parts centers (Figure 1). Product departments
formed steering committees for different areas (with different members, depending
on the application) to determine if customers had a common set of needs suitable for
a package, and then allocated funds from the Fuchu Works' budget for these special
projects. Some packages were utilities usable in different departments, although most
served specific applications. For example, PODIA (Plant Operation by Displayed
Information and Automation), a package created in the department for nuclear power
plants, covered all the basic functions common t these systems and accounted for
about half the software the department delivered.
The reusing parts manufacturing departments and parts centers, at the
project, product-department, and factory levels, evaluated new software and
documentation to make certain it met factory standards; after certification, engineers
registered the software in department or factory reuse databases (libraries).
Registered items required a key-word phrase to represent the functionality of the
part or correspond to a specific object, as well as a brief "description for reusers"
that explained the part's basic characteristics. These descriptions came in a code-like
format, with specific names such as "slab" or "roller" converted to generalized
notations like "MOVING_OBJECT." The cataloging procedures also required
engineers to identify parts they expected to reuse frequently, such as common
subroutines, and those they did not, such as job-oriented applications packages they
might retrieve once at the beginning of development rather than daily. The factory
kept the frequently reused software (source code and functional abstracts) on easily
accessible disk files and the less frequently reused software on magnetic tape.
Evaluation criteria to determine which software parts were good enough for
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reuse focused on measu res such as fitness, quality, clarity, abstractness, simplicity,
coupling level (with other modules), completeness, "human interface" (module
identification andalgorithmdescriptions), software interface, performance (response
time), and internal configuration of the module. These criteria supported more
specific, factory-oriented guidelines: The contents of a module (objects,
relationships between objects, algorithms) had.to be easily understandable to users
who did not develop the code. The interfaces and requirements to execute the
software (other code needed, language being used, operating system, automatic
interrupts, memory needed, input/output devices, etc. ) had to be clearly specified.
The software had to be portable (executable on various types of computers) or
transferable (modifiable to run on different computers, if not designed to be
portable). Finally, the software had to be retrievable in a program library by people
who were not familiar with it.
Toshiba had tools similar to Hitachi's EAGLE, NEC's SEA/I, and Fujitsu's
PARADIGM, ACS-APG, and BAGLES/CAD to support reuse of designs and coded
modules, as well as other functions. A corporate R&D group, formally attached to the
Fuchu Works, developed these and more advanced tools. One example is a tool that
facilitates the labelling and retrieving of reusable modules, relying on a special
language Toshiba developed, called OKBL (Object-Oriented Knowledge-Based
Language). A menus asks users a series of questions to define precisely what type
of part they needed. For example, if developers want to see what functional modules
are available for a particular application, they can enter the library for that
application and then type "function" when asked for "Super-class." If the desired
function is to scan analog data from a measuring instrument, they can type "scan"
when the system asks for the subclass and "analog" when it asks for the kind of data.
The tool then specifies the method of scanning, providing choices under other
14
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subclasses.
While the OKBL tool appeared relatively easy to use and will probably become
more useful as Toshiba refines it, factory personnel, especially those having worked
several years in the factory, seemed to rely mainly on manual techniques and
experience -- printed catalogues of reusable software and knowledge gained from
prior efforts -- to find software in libraries appropriate for new projects. Since
Toshiba organized most reusable software as large packages in department libraries,
and many departments used only a few packages to build most of their systems,
developers quickly became familiar with the contents of different packages and do not
seem to require much tool support. On the other hand, Toshiba reused only about 10%
of delivered software across product departments. Thus better methods and tools to
index and retrieve software components in a more generic fashion seems important to
increase reuse further because this will make more designs, code, or packages
accessible to members of different product departments who do not have a personal
familiarity with either the application or existing software.
Even though Toshiba still had room to improve inter-departmental reuse, within
the departments, management relied on an integrated set of incentives and controls
to encourage project managers and personnel to take the time to write reusable
software parts and reuse them frequently. At the start of each project, managers
agreed to productivity targets that they could not meet without reusing a certain
percentage of specifications, designs, or code. Design review meetings held at the
end of each phase in the development cycle then checked how well projects met reuse
targets, in addition to schedules and customer requirements. At the programmer
level, when building new software, management required project members to register
a certain number of components in the reuse databases, for other projects. Personnel
also received awards for registering particularly valuable or frequently reused
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modules, and they received formal evaluations from superiors on whether they met
their reuse targets. The SWB system, meanwhile, monitored reuse levels as well as
deviations from targets both at the project and individual levels, and sent regular
reports to managers.
To implement reuse objectives at the level of module design and coding, as
opposed to the level of system design, Toshiba relied on another methodology, called
"50SM" (50 Steps/Module). '° As suggested by the name, the basic concept involved
limiting the number of lines of code (steps) in one module to 50 or less (about one
page), making the parts easier to understand and redeploy. The 50SM method
covered three kinds of modules -- procedu ral (subroutines, functions, macros, etc. ),
data (files, variables or constants in memory, interface data, etc.), and packages
(abstract data types, library programs, etc. ). The factory also required a "technical
description formula" to outline the external and internal module specifications as well
as inter-module relationships. The 50SM presented a constraint in that the technique
primarily supported structured design and reuse in procedural languages such as C,
FORTRAN, COBOL, PASCAL, and Ada, rather than the use of newer object-oriented
or logic-programming languages, which, for some applications, had advantages.
Furthermore, in practice, only about half of new modules met the 50-line limit,
although the remainder were close, usually within 100 to 150 lines. Nonetheless, this
simple technique helped make reusable code and designs understandable, and worked
well with tools such as code generators and editors.
Toshiba management reinforced its reusability strategythrough training of new
personnel in program development and in maintenance. In-house educational courses
showed employees how to build software starting at higher levels of abstraction
(requirements and design) and then working downward, which managers claimed
increases the number of reused modules and the reuse frequency of a reused module.
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At the same time, in program design, Toshiba trained personnel to abstract data,
define standardized interfaces and parameters, and follow the factory procedures for
cataloging and documenting. Furthermore, even if projects did not reuse particular
programs, managers felt the same techniques for design, testing, documentation, and
library registration that aided reuse simplified software maintenance, perhaps the
most costly part of software development for programs with a long life span and
frequent changes. It might even be the case that savings in maintenance alone made
the extra effort required for reusability worthwhile.
Performance Improvements: Table 2 shows gross software productivity for the Fuchu
Works and the Toshiba Software Factory from 1972 to 1985, and reuse rates in the
programming or coding phase as well as new code estimates from 1977, when the
software factory opened. Particularly striking is the rise in productivity (delivered
equivalent-assembler source lines per person per month, excluding operating
systems, utilities, and other basic software) and the obvious impact of increasing
reuse, measured at the code level. Productivity rose from 1,390 lines per person per
month in 1976 to over 3,100 in 1985, while reuse levels (lines of delivered code taken
from existing software) increased from 13% in 1979 to 48% in 1985. About 60% of the
code delivered in 1985 was in Fortran, 20% in high-level problem-oriented languages,
and 20% in assembler; the equivalents of these are expressed in assembler, using
Toshiba's internal conversion coefficients.
In terms of improvement rates, in the five years prior to the start of the
factory, productivity gains appeared erratic, even dropping 12% in 1975. Fuchu
software developers improved output 13% between 1972 and 1973, but nominal
productivity in 1976 was still no higher than the 1973 level. In contrast, output per
worker rose dramatically in 1978, the first full year of factory operations, while
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productivity doubled the 1975 level by 1981. Productivity improvements slowed
considerably after 1981, but still averaged 6% or 7% annually. Production of new code
actually followed a declining trend, since reusing more code required more time to
read and modify the recycled parts, as well as more time to write code (and designs)
for reuse. Toshiba's ability to recycle code rose dramatically in some years, such as
between 1982 and 1983, but rose less rapidly afterward, stopping at just under 50% in
1985. The general leveling off of gross productivity improvements appeared to relate
directly to a leveling off in reuse increases, although more data is needed to establish
this trend more precisely.
Despite slowing gains in productivity and reusability, output per employee at
the Software Factory already appeared high by the mid-1980s. The 3,130 lines of
EASL source code per month per employee in 1985 translate into approximately 1,000
lines of Fortran-equivalent code. This monthly productivity estimated in Fortran
equalled the Japanese average reported by Cusumano and Kemerer in their survey of
Japanese and U.S. software projects, also adjusted for language differences, and
exceeded by a largemargin the U. S. adjusted averageof about 600 Fortran-equivalent
lines per work-month. Other adjustments to the Toshiba numbers produce figures
that, while still laudable, are not quite as dramatic as nominal productivity suggested.
Subtracting reused code from the 1985 data (which is not completely appropriate,
since reusing code systematically requires time to write for reuse and to implement
reuse), Toshiba employees averaged a still impressive 1,600 EASL or around 500 lines
of new Fortran code per month. Adjusting for estimated overtime of 70 hours per
month by recalculating for a 160-hour month, Toshiba personnel in 1985 delivered
about 2,200 EASL (700 Fortran-equivalent), including reused code, and about 1,100
EASL (370 Fortran-equivalent), subtracting reused code. But while this latter
number did not suggest that Toshiba had a huge advantage over other firms, it was
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still impressive given the size and complexity of the systems Toshiba delivered, the
low level of defects, and the fact that half the factory employees were high-school
graduates (albeitJapanesehigh-school graduates, with basiccalculus, statistics, and
a variety of science courses and other college-level material behind them).
Of course, data on productivity and reusability, as well as quality, are difficult
to compare across firms. It is also difficult to measure reuse of designs, which is often
more important than reuse of executable code, since designs can be modified more
easily for different applications and machines. (The Toshiba Software Factory in 1985
claimed to reuse about one-thi rd of its design documentation and generated much code
more-or-less automatically from detailed designs, often in a flow-chart form, although
it is not clear how design reuse affected the delivered EASL numbers.) In any case,
since Toshiba appears to have collected its numbers consistently, its data provide
some sense at least of changes in productivity and reuse over time at the factory. The
numbers thus suggest strongly that (1) the factory emphasis on reusability doubled
nominal productivity levels, and (2) reusability involved some costs, such as in
overhead as well as in a decline in new-code productivity. On this last observation,
Toshiba's internal studies of reuse rates, number of lines in modules changed when
reused, and overall output per person, indicated that productivity was significantly
improved only if about 80% of a module was reused without changes. If only 20% was
used unchanged, the impact on overall productivity was negative. Between 20%6 and
80%, there was no noticeable impact on productivity. (Hitachi and Fujitsu reported
similar findings in their studies of reuse and productivity.)
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CONCLUSION: A SPECTRUM OF REUSE STRATEGIES
Reusability, and reuse-promotion strategies, actually fell across a spectrum.
This ranged from no reuse, because of no commonality in applications or stability in
program architectures and functions, to various degrees of accidental or ad hoc reuse
and then to systematic reuse, with categorizations of software going beyond
application domain libraries to indexing software modules and designs by functional
content (Table 3). Any software producer might achieve occasional reuse if
individuals remember what software they or other groups had built in the past that
resembles what they want to do in the present. But factory approaches such as
Toshiba's promoted more frequent and systematic reuse by planning across a series
of projects as well as devising tools, libraries, reward and control systems, and
training techniques to maximize the writing of reusable softwa re components and their
recycling as often as possible, at least within similar product families. In theory,
design for reuse constituted an investment in proven components that developers and
customers should want to recycle. In practice, reuse promotion faced technological
as well as organizational obstacles whose solution required not merely technical
analysis and support, but also management planning along with controls and
incentives above the level of the individual project.
The best departments in Toshiba and other Japanese firms also managed reuse
in relatively flexible ways. Developers mixed packages with new code -- thus giving
customers the option of buying a semi-customized product rather than either a
standardized package or a fully-customized system. Support tools emphasized the
reuse of designs as much or more than executable code; this made it easier to modify
features for different applications or reuse software across incompatible operating
systems and hardware architectures. In addition, writing new designs and code for
reusability, and depositing new parts in reuse libraries, created a continually
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expanding inventory of proven components that developers and customers should
want to recycle. Raising reusability to the level of a factory policy also seemed to
counteract objections by programmers to reusing other people's work and by project
managers to absorbing overhead costs associated with designing, documenting, and
testing softwareforgeneral usage ratherthan fora specificapplication. In addition,
Japanese companies made reuse-support systems available to in-house developers,
subsidiaries and subcontractors, as well as users of their hardware, thus increasing
the dissemination of these tools and techniques along with shifting some of the custom-
programming burden to users.
Still, one must not overestimate the extent and nature of reuse in Toshiba or
other Japanese firms. Like their counterparts around the world, Japanese facilities
mainly confined the recycling of components to similar product families and used
relatively simple classification techniques and support tools. They also reused most
of their software in systems with relatively stable architectures and functions, such
as control systems for power plants and automated factories, or common businesss
applications for mainframe computers. As a result, opportunities for greater reuse
clearly existed in Japan, especially across different types of products with
technologies that identify the functional content of software components. But
whatever the future of reuse in Japan or elsewhere, their accumulation of practical
experience, as well as a steadfast commitment to exploiting reusability to improve both
productivity and quality, suggested that Japanese software factories would remain
among industry leaders in promoting systematic rather than accidental reuse.
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Table 1: Approximate Breakdown of Reused Software in Toshiba
Breakdown Comments
100% TOTAL SYSTEM Delivered lines of custom applications
software for an individual project, excluding
basic systems software.
Size: 1,000,000 to 21,000,000 EASL
50% REUSED SOFTWARE
(White-Box Designs) Applications-specific packages or subsystems
of design skeletons. Written, documented, and
registered for reuse in product-department
application libraries.
Size: Usually 1000 to 10,000 EASL
(Utilities, Tools) Applications-specific utilities, tools, or other
special programs imbedded in delivered
software. Written, documented, and registered
for reuse in product-department libraries
mainly but also in factory libraries.
Size: Usually 10,000 to 100,000 EASL.
(Black-Box Modules) Coded subroutines common to most software
made in the factory. Written, documented, and
registered for reuse from a central factory
library. Approximately 10% of reuse.
Size: Usually up uo 3000 EASL.
50% NEW SOFTWARE Plant- or customer-specific software, not
considered reusable but written, documented,
and registered in a similar manner for
maintenance. Often written with advanced
fourth-generation languages that generate
code from menus or tables of application
functions or specifications.
Source: Cusumano 1991, p. 260.
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Table 2: Performance at Toshiba Software Factory
Notes: EASL = Debugged and Delivered Equivalent Assembler Source
Lines Per Programmer Per Month, Averaging All
Projects in the Factory and Including All Phases and
Manpower (Requirements Analysis through Maintenance)
Index = Based on 1972 EASL productivity estimate (1230)
Change = Percent increase or decrease over previous year
Reuse % =
New Code =
Percent of delivered lines of code taken from existing
software with little or no modifications (usually no more
than 20% of a given module)
EASL x [ (100 - Reuse %)/100 ]
Defects Per 1000 Lines of Delivered Code
EAS L
Converted to
Year Total EASL Index/Change Reuse New Code Defects Employees
Delivered (100) (%) % (EASL) Per 1000 (All
Per Person EASL Phases)
Per Month
PRE-FACTORY ESTIMATES:
1972 1230 100 -- Data Not Available
1973 1390 113 +13
1974 1370 111 - 2
1975 1210 98 -12
1976 1390 113 +15
POST-FACTORY ESTIMATES:
1977 Data Not Available
1978 1684 137 -- -- -- 7 to 20 1200
1979 1988 162 +18 13 1730 1500
1980 2072 168 + 4 16 1740 1700
1981 2443 199 +18 29 1735 2050
1982 2595 210 + 6 26 1920 2100
1983 2763 225 + 7 41 1630 2150
1984 2931 238 + 6 45 1612 2250
1985 3130 254 + 7 48 1612 0.2 to 0.05 2300
Source: Cusumano 1991, p. 240.
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Table 3: The Reusability Spectrum
Reuse Levels:
None No Commonality Among Projects
No Stability in Program Architectures and Functions
No Design Planning or Management for Multiple Projects
No Reuse Support Tools And Libraries
No Reuse Promotion Organization And Incentives
Little or No Measurable Reuse
Some Some Commonality Among Projects
Some Stability in Program Architectures and Functions
No Design Planning or Management for Multiple Projects
No Reuse Support Tools And Libraries
No Reuse Promotion Organization And Incentives
Occasional But Still Ad Hoc or Accidental Reuse
More Much Commonality Among Projects
More Stability in Program Architectures and Functions
Some Design Planning or Management for Multiple Projects
Reuse Support Tools And Libraries For Application Domains
No Reuse Promotion Organization And Incentives
More Frequent But Not Maximum Reuse
Most Much Commonality Among Projects
Much Stability in Program Architectures and Functions
Design Planning and Management for Multiple Projects
Reuse Support Tools And Libraries By Software Content
Reuse Promotion Organization And Incentives
Systematic and Maximum Reuse
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Figure 1: Toshiba's Reusability Promotion System
Source: Matsumoto 1987, p. 173. Reproduced with permission.
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